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Age Structure of the Workforce 





An important task of human resource management is the development and retention of an 
efficient workforce. Therefore, applicants have to be checked, whether they are in line 
with the requirements of a certain job. Besides, the characteristics of employees may 
change over time and comparative advantages differ between young and older workers. 
Next to differences between young and older employees, the age-specific composition of 
the workforce is an important question. The productivity of a certain employee might be 
affected by her colleague. It might matter, whether this employee works together with a 
similar-aged colleague or with someone from a very different generation. It is important to 
know, whether firms with homogeneous rather than heterogeneous workforces are doing 
well. 
 
In this contribution, we want to address the two questions: (1) “Are firms with young 
rather than older employees successful?” and (2) “Are firms with homogeneous rather 
than heterogeneous workforces successful?” There exist a bunch of theoretical arguments, 
from which hypotheses can be derived for these two issues. However, empirical evidence 
is rare. There are merely some cross-section studies of a very limited number of firms, 
which study implications of corporate age structures. The results include that changes in 
strategy are rather observable in firms with young top-management teams (Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992), that the frequency of communication is positively associated with 
homogeneity in age (Zenger & Lawrence, 1989) and that labor turnover is negatively 
interrelated with both age and homogeneity in age (O’Reilly et al., 1989; Wiersema & 
  1Bird, 1993). Few papers also establish a relationship to some kind of measures for firm 
performance. Pelled et al. (1999) analyze 45 teams of three firms and find a positive 
interrelation between age heterogeneity and group performance evaluated by the team 
manager. Kilduff et al. (2000) confirm this result using data of 159 managers playing a 
business game. In contrast, Simons et al. (1999) find a negative relationship between 
heterogeneity in age and growth of sales analyzing data of 57 manufacturing firms. 
Currently, Bellmann et al. (2003) ask managers of German firms for age-specific 
capacities of employees. A majority assigns advantages for older employees for the 
characteristics know-how, working morale and awareness for quality. In contrast, younger 
employees have advantages concerning ability and willingness to learn and physical 
resilience. 
 
Previous work has not provided a satisfying answer concerning the addressed research 
questions so far. The previous studies only build on a very limited number of firms and the 
link to firm performance is not sufficiently examined. Therefore, we will address to the 
issues ‘young versus older employees’ and ‘homogeneous versus heterogeneous 
workforces’ using linked employer-employee data from Denmark. In particular, we 
analyze the relationship between firm performance – measured as value added per 
employee – and mean age and standard deviation of age of the firms’ workforces. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we derive hypotheses concerning both research 
questions (‘young versus older employees’ and ‘homogeneous versus heterogeneous 
workforces’) with reference to several different theoretical approaches (Section 2). In 
Section 3, we describe the data and the variables, before we present our empirical results. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
  22. Corporate Age Structures – Theoretical Considerations  
There is not a one and only theory of corporate age structures. Instead, it is possible to 
derive hypotheses from different theoretical approaches concerning the two questions 
‘young versus older employees’ and ‘homogeneous versus heterogeneous workforces’. 
We take a short-term – point of time – approach and ask for theoretical hints, whether (1) 
firms with young rather than older employees are successful and (2) whether firms with 
homogeneous or heterogeneous workforces concerning age doing well.  
 
Several approaches make a statement with respect to the first research question. First, 
Becker (1962) analyses (firm-) specific human capital, which – by definition – only 
enhances employees’ productivity in the original firm. He argues that firms and employees 
shall share costs and benefits of investments in specific human capital in order to avert the 
hold-up problem and – consequentially – under-investments in human capital (see Figure 
1). Hence, firms with older employees are supposed to be successful, because productivity 
outweighs wages only for older employees.  
 
Figure 1: Wages (W) and productivity (V) profiles with firm-specific human capital 
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Note: W = wage, V = productivity, Alt = alternative wage/productivity 
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Second, Lazear (1979) suggests some kind of deferred compensation in order to prevent 
employees from shirking. In this sense, some kind of wage bond is built up in the first part 
of an employee’s career (W1<V1), which is paid back afterwards, if the employee forbears 
from shirking and is not dismissed (W2>V2, see Figure 1). Comparing wages with 
productivity at one certain point of time again, firms with young employees are the 
successful ones. 
 
Other approaches argue that there is incomplete information about employees’ ability at 
the beginning of their careers. As a consequence, young employees exert much effort in 
order to suggest high ability levels. Employees may avoid to work together with weaker 
colleagues (Akerlof, 1976) or try to increase future earnings and the external labor market 
takes the work result as a measure for unknown talent (Fama, 1980; Holmström, 
1982/1999). This is therefore another argument for the hypothesis that firms with young 
employees are doing well. In contrast, job shopping (Johnson, 1978) speaks for the 
argument that firms with older employees are the successful ones. If employees do not 
know their exact abilities and requisitions of different jobs, they will test various jobs as 
long as they find a good match. Then, seniors are located at a good match with a higher 
probability. 
 
The second issue is the question, whether firms with homogeneous rather than 
heterogeneous workforces are doing well. Hypotheses with respect to this question can 
also be derived from different theoretical approaches. Lazear (1998, pp. 169ff) argues that 
there are usually complementarities among the different kinds of human capital of young 
and older workers. Young employees have new ideas and skills on new technologies, 
whereas older employees have knowledge about the intra-firm structures and the relevant 
markets and networks. Usually, both kinds of human capital are necessary for firm 
productivity. Hence, a mixture of age groups seems to be beneficial. The effect of 
  4complementarities in human capital can be illustrated by a formal example. A simple 
production function of a firm is given by  
) ( ) ( x n x x n x − γ + − β + α = Π , 
where x represents the number of older employees and n-x the number of young 
employees so that n is the number of employees in the firm. The corresponding 
productivity parameters of older and young employees are given by α and β. The amount 
of complementarities among older and young employees is characterized by γ. The 
optimal number of older employees in this firm can easily be calculated by deriving the 
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Therefore, the optimal number of older employees is increasing in their productivity and 
decreasing in the productivity of the young employees. Furthermore, a heterogeneous 
workforce is beneficial, if complementarities are evident (γ>0). In the extreme case 
( ), the workforce will be divided in equal shares to young and older employees 
( ). The implementation of this complementarities argument in practice is 
called diversity management, which is also a big issue in the management literature. It is 
argued that the conjunction of employees with divergent backgrounds (mainly race and 
gender are discussed next to age) can act as a strategic resource for firms (see e.g. Ely & 
Thomas, 2001, and Kochan et al., 2003). 
∞ → γ
2 / . n xopt =
 
In contrast, the organizational demography approach (Pfeffer, 1981, 1983, 1985) argues 
that social similarity is important for interaction, communication and cohesion. Therefore, 
social dissimilarities between co-workers lead to dissatisfaction, less communication and 
in conclusion to an alleviated efficiency of the organizations. Hence, organizational 
demography states that firms with homogeneous workforces are beneficial. A counter-
  5argument from social psychology is also discussed in the management literature. Social 
comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) argues that individuals have an innate tendency to 
compare and evaluate themselves with similar others. People then try to act better than this 
comparison group, what may lead to rivalry and conflicts among similarly aged persons 
(see Pelled et al., 1999, and the literature cited there). Hence, firms with heterogeneous 
aged workforces are supposed to be successful. However, it must not be neglected that the 
quality of decisions may improve, when rivals challenge their different views. 
Furthermore, there are arguments that also productive efforts increase in competitive 
situations (e.g. Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Another argument for having different age groups 
in a company comes from overlapping generations’ models. Cremer (1986) shows within 
an OLG-model with n evenly distributed age cohorts in a firm that this structure can lead 
to cooperation among age cohorts, who forbear from shirking in prisoner dilemma 
situations. In contrast, it would be individually rational for employees to free ride, if there 
were no overlapping generation structure. 
 
3. Age Structures and Performance of Danish Firms 
It should become clear that divergent hypotheses with respect to both research questions 
can be derived. Hence, it is an empirical question, which arguments prevail in practice. 
Therefore, the following empirical examination is a first attempt to analyze the link 
between corporate age structures and firm performance on a broad level. We do not test 
one certain theoretical approach against another, but check the relative importance of the 
arguments discussed above. Before we present the results, we will describe the data and 
the variables used. 
 
3.1 Data  
The data used in this study originate from two sources: The first is the IDA (Integrated 
Database for Labour Market Research) Register from Statistics Denmark. IDA contains 
information on labor market conditions for persons and workplaces in Denmark over the 
years 1980-1998. These data originate from various administrative registers. The 
  6important feature of IDA is that it is possible to associate workplaces with the identity of 
all employees at a specific day in November each year. Employers are defined by their 
employer identification number, which is changed if ownership changes in a strictly legal 
sense.
1 We have corrected for those cases where more than 50% of all employees are 
taken over by the new legal employer. In these cases, the workplace is said to continue.  
 
Data on workplaces are subsequently aggregated to firms by Statistics Denmark for Center 
for Corporate Performance. For a sub-sample of firms with more than 20 employees, these 
data have been merged with data on financial information concerning profit, total revenue, 
total costs, investments and capital. These data cover the period 1992-1997. 
 
The individual data include information on gender, age, education, occupational status and 
wage. For each firm and year, we are able to calculate descriptive statistics (means and 
standard deviations) of these variables. Thus, the great advantage of our data is that we 
can observe not only a sample of firms and/or employees, but the whole population of 
both sides of the Danish market. By aggregating the information of the employees and 
matching it to the firms, we get a data set where the firm/year is the unit. The data set 
results in some 30,000 observations.
2 During the six-year period (1992–1997), there is 
information of about 7,000 different firms. Hence, we have an unbalanced panel. 
 
3.2 Variables 
We measure firm performance with the log of value added per employee. Value added is 
thereby defined as net revenue (after rebates and after tax) less purchase of goods (freight, 
raw and auxiliary materials, external wages). All observations are deflated with the 
consumer price index with the year 1997 as the base. One can argue that not value added 
but profit (defined as value added minus wage cost) matters. Using profit instead of value 
added does not change our results, though.  
 
                                                 
1 A detailed description of the data is given at http://data.ccp.asb.dk. 
2 We deleted some outliers (firms with extreme values of value added and with extreme variations in the 
numbers of employees). All results are robust with regard to this restriction of the sample. 
 
  7The age structure of the workforce is captured by using the mean age and the standard 
deviation of the employees’ age. Some previous studies use the coefficient of variation, 
which is defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean, as their measure for the 
age heterogeneity of the workforce (see O’Reilly et al., 1989; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992; 
Wiersema & Bird, 1993; Pelled et al., 1999; Kilduff et al., 2000). They partly refer to 
Allison (1978), who argues that the coefficient of variation is a useful inequality measure 
for cardinal-scaled variables. We do not doubt that the coefficient of variation is a proper 
measure for wage inequality, for example. However, there are problems when analyzing 
age heterogeneity. The coefficient of variation will show the maximum heterogeneity if 
the workforce of the firm consists of one very old and n-1 very young employees. Besides, 
the coefficient of variation states decreasing age heterogeneity of firms, which employ 
exactly the same employees year by year, because the average age of such a workforce 
goes up while its standard deviation remains constant. In our view, there is a constant age 
heterogeneity in such a firm. Hence, we use the standard deviation instead of the 
coefficient of variation as our measure for heterogeneity with respect of age.
3
 
The composition of the workforce with respect to other characteristics than age might also 
be linked to firm performance. We can control for tenure, schooling, percentage of 
females and blue collars. Additionally, wages still have to be paid from value added and 
there might be firm-size, industry and year effects. At last, firm performance might be 
associated to the age of the firm, when product lifecycles are relevant and market entry of 
goods and services is particularly observable for start-up firms. Table 1 summarizes the 
descriptive statistics of these variables. 
 
The firms generate an average value added per employee of DKK 430,000 (€ 58,000). The 
Danish economy is characterized by a large amount of small and medium-sized firms. 
Only about 10% of firms have more than 200 employees. The average mean age of firms’ 
workforces is 37 years and the average standard deviation slightly higher than 10 years. 
 
                                                 
3 Using the coefficient of variation instead of the standard deviation as the heterogeneity measure does not 
change the results, though. 
 
  8Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Standard  deviation 
Value added per employee (in 1,000 DKK)
  430.06 328.61 
Mean age (in years)  36.85  3.971 
Standard deviation of age  10.64  1.688 
Percentage females  0.276  0.218 
Percentage blue collars  0.619  0.259 
Mean tenure  5.616  2.539 
Mean education (in months)  144.95  13.48 
Standard deviation of education  27.67  5.806 
Mean wage (in DKK)  158.91  32.71 
Firm age  16.44  9.387 
Firm size (Number of employees)  103.79  382.55 




Analyzing the link between the age structure of the workforce and firm performance, it is 
first of all useful to generate scatter plots for both mean age and the standard deviation of 
age with value added per employee as the measure for firm performance (see Figures 2 
and 3). 
 
We find a clear pyramidal or inversely u-shaped interrelation between mean age and firm 
performance. Highest values for value added per employee are found in firms with an 
average age of employees of a little less than 40 years (see Figure 2). This cannot be 
explained with one of the above-discussed theoretical approaches alone. However, this 
result is in line, for instance, with combined relevance of specific human capital and 
deferred compensation. If investments in specific human capital are important at the 
beginning of employees’ careers and deferred compensation is at the end, the resulting 
wage profiles are flatter (steeper) than the productivity profiles at the beginning (end) of 
careers.
4 Then, firms with medium aged workforces are doing well.  
                                                 
4 Okazaki (1993) finds evidence for Japan that the productivity profile is steeper than the wage profile at the 
beginning of an employee’s career and the wage profile is steeper at its end. Figure A in the appendix 
illustrates this result. 
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There is also a pyramidal or inversely u-shaped link between age dispersion and firm 
performance. Firms with a standard deviation of about 10 years have the highest values for 
value added per employee (see Figure 3). In contrast, firms with either very homogeneous 
or very heterogeneous workforces with respect to age of employees have much lower 
value added.  
 
However, these bivariate outcomes may also be due to differences across firms with 
respect to branch of industry, firm size or composition of the workforce. Therefore, it is 
useful to control for these characteristics by estimating a multivariate linear model 
log (value added per employee) = β1 • Mean age   
    + β2 • (Mean age)
2
  
    + β3 • Standard deviation of age  
    + β4 • (Standard deviation of age)
2
  
    + X’δ + ε, 
where X represents a vector of other independent variables and ε an error term. A squared 
term of both age variables is included, because theory does not suggest a clear linear 
interrelation and the scatter plots show an inversely u-shaped link for both variables.  
Analyzing differences across firms, we first estimate this linear model with an ordinary 
least square approach (see Table 2). In general, the impressions of the scatter plots are 
confirmed. We find inversely u-shaped associations for both mean age and age dispersion. 
The coefficients for the linear (squared) terms are highly significantly positive (negative). 
However, there is a large amount of unobserved heterogeneity across firms. For instance, 
firms offer very different products or services even within a single industry. Taking the 
unobserved heterogeneity into account, we can make use of the panel data set and estimate 
a fixed effects model. In doing so, we virtually examine changes within firms. Again, we 
find inversely u-shaped interrelations for mean age and standard deviation of age with 
value added (see column (2) of Table 2). Using the coefficients, it is possible to calculate 
the max of the reserved u’s. Firms with a mean age of 37 years and a standard deviation of 
age of 9.5 years have the highest value added per employee.  
 
  11Table 2: Regressions on firm performance                                                        
Dependent variable: log (value added per employee) 
  (1) OLS   (2) Fixed effects 
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Industry dummies (6)  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies (6)  Yes  Yes 




R² 0.280  0.051 
Number of observations  29,863  29,863 
Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 level. 
 
  12By dividing the sample with respect to firm size, we can see that the results are rather 
driven by small and medium-sized firms than by huge firms. There is less variation of 
firms’ age structures in large companies. Besides small firms – in contrast to large firms – 
have hardly any discretion with respect to the decision of who is supposed to work 
together with his or her colleague. Additionally, there are some differences between 
industries. In contrast to other industries, there are no significant results for the 
construction industry. The estimated max of the inverted u concerning mean age differs 
across the other industries between 35 and 40 years. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This contribution offers first hints for a general link between the age structure of firms’ 
workforces and firm performance. As a main result, we find inversely u-shaped 
interrelations between mean age and standard deviation of age with firm performance. 
Certainly, this is only a first step and much more has to be done in the future. First, the 
exact age distribution of firms should be analyzed. Pfeffer (1985) mentions a case study, 
“in which hiring of engineers between 30 and 45 in the spacecraft engineering area was 
advocated to flatten the current bimodal distribution of 40-60-year-olds and 25-30-year-
olds, with a gap in the middle.” Currently BMW has begun to hire many older employees, 
because the management identifies an unbalanced age structure of the workforce in many 
parts of the company with too many young and only very few older employees (Niasseri, 
2005). Using these indicators and perhaps the theoretical approach of Cremer (1986), it 
might be beneficial for firms to establish a workforce with uniformly distributed age 
cohorts. Given the results of our empirical study that firms with a mean age (standard 
deviation of age) of 37 years (9.5 years) have the highest values of value added, a uniform 
distribution would suggest an age span of employees from 20.5 to 53.5 years.
5 This is, 
                                                 
5 Note that the standard deviation of a uniform distribution is given by  ) ( 12 / 1 a b− ⋅ , where b and a are the 
upper and lower limits of age. 
  13however, only one possible distribution. A normal distribution with mean 37 and a 
standard deviation of 9.5 would suggest that 95% of the employees are between 18 and 56 
years old. Besides, nothing is said with respect to a possible skewness of the distribution. 
If a firm uses the possibility to screen young employees and offers only the more talented 
ones a long-term contract, the age distribution is automatically skewed to the right. 
 
Future research should also concentrate on long-term effects. It would be desirable to 
create data sets with a longer observation period, which would make it possible to analyze 
changes in firms over a longer time. This would also improve the possibility to ensure that 
there is really a causal effect and not only a correlation. Besides, it seems to be very 
interesting, whether our results hold for different countries with other institutional 
environments. In contrast to other European countries, Denmark has hardly any dismissal 
protection and a large amount of labor turnover, for instance.  
 
Analyzing corporate age structures, the ongoing demographic change in Europe is 
necessarily worth mentioning. The baby boomer generation – the age cohorts born during 
the 1960s – will become the large fraction of older employees during the next 15 years. 
Neither before nor after that decade birth cohorts have been that large (see Figure 4). The 
number of births per year in EU-15 has declined from about 6 millions in the 1960s to less 
than 4 millions today.  
 
This fact poses a huge challenge not only for the pension scheme of every country, but 
also for human resource management of firms. A lack of young specialists and executive 
staff in the near future is easily foreseeable. Therefore, firms should elaborate a proper 
strategy to react to this challenge already today. Possible measures include an increased 
employment of senior persons (with appropriate personnel development schemes) and an 
increased employment of women as well as foreigners. Additionally, an amplified contact 
to schools and universities might enable firms to recruit graduates before competitors. 
Increased labor piracy is also a conceivable measure. Anticipating this problem, firms 
  14have also to think about appropriate measures to prevent raiding. The analysis of this issue 
represents another exciting task of future research. 
Figure 4: Age pyramid of EU-15 in 2002 
          M e n                W o m e n  











Note: W = wage profile, V = productivity profile. Relevance for the sharing rule of specific human 
up to t*. Relevance for deferred compensation from t* on. 
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